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Abstract: Despite large regional policy expenditures, regional
inequalities in Europe have not narrowed substantially over the
last two decades, and by some measures have even widened.
Income differences across States have fallen, but inequalities
between regions within each State have risen. European States
have developed increasingly different production structures.
And European regions have also become increasingly polarised
in terms of their unemployment rates. This paper describes these
trends, and discusses how recent location theories can help us
to explain them and to reconsider the role of regional policies,
especially transport infrastructure improvements, in such an en-
vironment.
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Profound regional income disparities exist in the European Union. Nearly one quarter of its
citizens live in regions1 eligible to receive assistance under ‘objective 1’ of the Structural Funds,
the main instrument of eu regional policy. The criterion for eligibility is to have a Gross Domestic
Product per capita below 75% of the eu average. If a similar measure was used for the United
States, only two States, Mississippi and West Virginia, containing between them only 2% of the us
population, would qualify (Puga, 1999).
Therearealsolargedisparitiesacrosstheregionsoftheeuintermsoftheirunemploymentrates.
In 1996 the 10 regions with highest unemployment rates had twice the eu average unemployment
rate. In comparison, differences in unemployment rates across us States are minimal. And
differences across European regions are not just the reﬂection of differences in unemployment
rates across countries. Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom all have a difference of at least 700 basis points between the unemployment rate of their
highest unemployment region and that of their lowest unemployment region.
The growing concern about reducing these regional disparities has made the ﬁnancial instru-
ments of eu regional policy the fastest-growing component of the eu Budget. The Structural Funds
have been allocated €195,000 million (at 1999 prices) for the period 2000–2006. They now account
for over 30% of total eu spending (twice the proportion they represented in 1988), and for about
0.4% of total eu Gross National Product. The Cohesion Fund, introduced as a ﬁnancial instrument
in 1993, is to provide another €18,000 million for structural spending in 2000–2006.
Despite this sizable intervention, regional inequalities in Europe have not narrowed substan-
tially, and by some measures have even widened. Over the past ﬁfteen years income differences
across Member States have fallen, but inequalities between regions within each Member State have
risen. Over the same period, the production structures of eu Member States have become increas-
ingly different. European regions have also become more unequal in terms of their unemployment
rates: there are now fewer regions with intermediate unemployment rates than a decade ago, and
more regions with either high or low rates.
Recent theories of location can help us explain these trends. Traditionally, international and
regional economics have explained income disparities on the basis of differences between regions
in their endowments of natural resources, factors of production, infrastructure, or technology.
In this context, the removal of obstacles to the movement of goods and/or factors would by
itself cause convergence of factor returns and living standards. Yet both casual observation and
empirical work in the area show there are relevant forces missing from the traditional analysis,
which can widen regional disparities — even without large differences in underlying character-
istics — and prevent convergence. The main argument arises from the observation that ﬁrms
produce more efﬁciently and workers enjoy higher welfare by being close to large markets, and
thatlargemarketsareinturnthosewheremoreﬁrmsandworkerslocate. Thiscreatesacumulative
causation process that tends to increase regional differences. Mechanisms of this kind have been
1Deﬁned at level 2 of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (nuts), a hierarchical classiﬁcation with
three regional levels established by Eurostat to provide comparable regional breakdowns of the Member States of the
eu. In 1996 the eu had 77 nuts 1 regions, 206 nuts 2 regions, and 1,031 nuts 3 regions (Eurostat, 1995).
1described by development economists and geographers for some time. The main contribution
of what has been called ‘new economic geography’ is to bring together, in a common analytical
framework, both convergence and divergence forces. The advantage of modelling such forces in
a common framework is that we can relate their relative strength to microeconomic conditions,
and explicitly study the trade-off between the economic advantages of the clustering of activity
and the inequalities that it may bring. Recent location theories can thus help us understand the
evolution of regional inequalities during a process of economic integration, and think about the
role of regional policy in such an environment. Such an analysis is the object of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the recent
evolution of regional inequalities in the eu. Section 3 reviews location theories developed in what
has been called the ‘new economic geography’, and uses them to explain the trends described in
the previous section. Section 4 then looks at European regional policies in light of these theories.
The discussion of regional policies is selective rather than exhaustive, reﬂecting the focus and
scope of the ‘new economic geography’. Since much of this work studies the effects of changes in
transport costs, a separate Section 5 focuses on transport infrastructure and its effects on regional
inequalities. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Regional inequalities in the European Union
Economic activity is less geographically concentrated in Europe than in the us. Nearly one-half of
eu industrial employment is concentrated in a small number (27) of nuts 1 regions, which account
for 17% of the Union’s total surface and 45% of its population. In the us nearly one half of the
country’s industrial employment is also concentrated in a small number (14) of States, but these
account for much smaller shares of total surface (13%) and population (21%).
Not only is overall activity less concentrated in Europe than in the us, but so are individual
sectors. Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) calculate for eu Member States and for us States an index
of spatial separation for individual industries2, and divide it by the same index for overall man-
ufacturing. They show that, even after accounting for the wider dispersion of overall industry in
Europe, most individual sectors are also more geographically dispersed than in the us.
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) also compare the industrial structures of eu Member States,
and show that these have become increasingly different over the last two decades. In fact,
the Netherlands is the only country whose industrial structure has become more similar to the
aggregate eu structure. The industrial structures of the four largest eu economies (France, the
United Kingdom (uk), Italy, and Germany) are relatively similar. However, Germany and Italy
are becoming increasingly different from each other as well as from France and the uk. The four
Cohesion States (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) have also become increasingly different
from each other. Spain is now more similar to France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany than to the
other three Cohesion States. Ireland is more similar to Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
2This spatial separation index is calculated as the production-weighted sum of all bilateral distances between loc-















Source: Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman, Redding, and Venables (2000)
Figure 1. Specialisation for eu Member States grouped by entry date
Finland and Sweden have remained similar to each other but have become increasingly different
from the rest.
The increasing sectoral specialisation of eu Member States has followed an uneven pace. Fig-
ure 1 (from Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000) plots an average index of national specialisation relative
to the eu for four groups of Member States (the initial Member States, the 1973 entrants, the 1980s
entrants, and the 1995 entrants). This shows little change in specialisation during the 1970s, and
then a phase of rising specialisation which has been particularly acute since the early 1980s for the
1980s entrants and since the mid-1990s for the 1995 entrants.
Given that production is less geographically concentrated in Europe than in the us, one might
expect a more even distribution of income per capita as well. In fact, the opposite is true: differ-
ences in income across European regions are much wider than across us States. In 1992 the ten
best-off regions had a gdp per person equal to 1.6 times the Union’s average and 3.5 times that of
the ten worst-off regions (at nuts 1 level). By comparison, the ten best-off us States had a gdp per
person equal to 1.2 times the us average and 1.5 times that of the ten worst-off States.
European regions experienced a clear convergence in income per capita up until the late 1970s,
when convergence came to a sudden stop (see, amongst others, Marcet, 1994, Canova and Marcet,
1995, Neven and Gouyette, 1995, López-Bazo, Vayá, Mora, and Suriñach, 1999, and Rodríguez-
Pose, 1999). Figure 2 (from de la Fuente and Vives, 1995) shows the clear exhaustion of regional
income convergence after the 1970s.
Additional information can be gathered by decomposing income inequalities, as measured by a
Theil index, into inequalities across countries and inequalities across regions within each country
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Figure 3. Decomposition of a Theil index of income inequalities across European regions
4(Esteban, 1999; Duro, 2001). Figure 3 (from Duro, 2001) shows that during the ﬁrst half of the
1980s income inequalities across eu Member States accounted for about one half of overall regional
inequalities, andinequalitiesacrossregionswithinthesameStateforaboutanotherhalf. Sincethen
income inequalities across States have fallen by 25%, but regional inequalities within States have
risen by 10%. As a result, nowadays most regional income inequalities in Europe are within rather
than across Member States.
Looking at inequality indices provides a useful, but partial, picture of the evolution of regional
inequalities across European regions. For instance, using summary statistics alone one cannot
discriminate between a situation in which regions roughly maintain their relative position over
time, and another one in which the shape of the distribution changes little but the relative positions
of particular regions change signiﬁcantly over time. One way to get at this is by looking at
geographical maps illustrating the whole regional distribution for different points in time.
Figure 4 graphs the gdp per capita relative to the eu average of the nuts 2 regions that made up
the eu in 1987 for that year and for 1995. The map shows only small changes in the relative income
level of individual regions. This is in contrast with the notable changes that appear when the same
map is drawn for relative unemployment rates in 1986 and in 1996, as shown in Figure 53.
More details can be learned by constructing transition probability matrices that track changes
over time in the relative position of regions within the distribution. This is an exercise that a
number of authors, including Quah (1999), have undertaken. The transition probability matrix
at the top of Table 1 is an update on that work, which reports transitions between the 1987 and
1995 distributions of gdp per capita relative to the European average (only regions that were part
of the eu at the beginning of the period are included in the calculation).4 The main diagonal of
this matrix gives the proportion of regions that were in the same range of the distribution in the
mid-1990s as in the mid-1980s. The large numbers on this diagonal show the strong persistence of
relative regional income levels. For instance, reading along the top row of the matrix, we see that
of the 30 regions that in 1987 had a gdp per capita below 0.6 times the eu average, 83% remained
in the same range in 1995, while 17% saw their relative income rise to between 0.6 and 0.75 times
the eu average, and none moved higher up in the distribution than this.
Again it is insightful to compare the distributions of gdp per capita and unemployment rates.
Up until the mid-1980s differences in unemployment rates across European regions were very
stable, with changes in regional labour forces just offsetting ongoing changes in regional employ-
ment (see chapter 6 in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1991). The transition probability matrix at
the bottom of Table 1 (from Overman and Puga, 2002) shows that this stability no longer holds. It
reports transitions between the 1986 and 1996 distributions of unemployment rates relative to the
European average. The contrast between changes in relative gdp per capita and changes in relative
unemployment rates can be seen most clearly by comparing the numbers on the main diagonal of
both transition matrices. This shows that for regions initially below 60% of the European average,
the proportion of regions that remained in the same range of the distribution in the mid-1990s as
3Note that the average unemployment rate for regions in the map was the same in 1986 and in 1996, and that these
years are separated by a full cycle. Greek regions are absent from the map due to lack of data
4The table also gives two additional pieces of information. The ﬁrst column gives n, the number of regions that begin
their transitions in a given state. The second column gives the classes that divide up the state space.
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n 1995 GDP per capita
30 [0–0.6) 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 [0.6–0.75) 0.21 0.47 0.32 0.00 0.00
50 [0.75–1) 0.00 0.18 0.68 0.14 0.00
53 [1–1.3) 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.72 0.15
18 [1.3–∞) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83
















t n 1996 Unemployment
21 [0–0.6) 0.81 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 [0.6–0.75) 0.52 0.26 0.09 0.09 0.04
42 [0.75–1) 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.00
32 [1–1.3) 0.06 0.22 0.34 0.19 0.19
32 [1.3–∞) 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.62
[0–0.6) [0.6–0.75) [0.75–1) [1–1.3) [1.3–∞)
Source (unemployment table): Overman and Puga (2002)
Table 1. Transition probability matrices of gdp per capita and unemployment rates relative to eu average
in the mid-1980s is as high for unemployment (81%) as for income (83%). For regions initially
above 130% of the European average, persistence is also very high in both distributions, although
it is more marked for income than for unemployment (83% against 62%). But for regions initially
around the middle of the distribution the difference is striking: most regions with intermediate
income levels remained in the same range whereas most regions with intermediate initial unem-
ployment rates moved to a different range.5
As a result of regions with intermediate unemployment rates moving towards both extremes of
the distribution, the distribution of European regional unemployment rates has become increas-
ingly polarised: there are now more regions with either very high or very low unemployment
and fewer regions in between as compared with the mid-1980s. The extent of this polarisation of
unemployment rates can be measured using the generalisation by Esteban, Gradín, and Ray (1999)
of the polarisation measure of Esteban and Ray (1994). Between 1986 and 1996, the polarisation
of the unemployment rate distribution into a group of high and a group of low unemployment
regions increased by 37%, from 0.096 to 0.131 (Overman and Puga, 2002).
5Esteban (1999) decomposes inequalities in gdp per capita, as measured by a Theil index, into differences in pro-
ductivity, unemployment, participation rates, and demographic factors. He ﬁnds that, differences in productivity
are still the largest component of income differences. Furthermore, interregional productivity differences are mostly
common across sectors (Esteban, 2000). However, differences in unemployment rates are becoming an increasingly
important component of income differences at the expense of other components, including productivity (Esteban, 1999).
8Overman and Puga (2002) argue that this polarisation of regional unemployment rates could be
driven by three factors: different reforms in national labour market institutions, a within-country
polarisationoflaboursupply, andawithin-countrypolarisationoflabourdemand. Theyshowthat
national considerations do not play the main role in explaining regional unemployment outcomes.
In fact, the unemployment outcomes of individual regions are much closer to the outcomes of
neighbouring regions (domestic and foreign) than to the average outcomes of other regions within
the same Member State. Regarding changes in labour supply, these not only have not caused
the polarisation of unemployment rates but have in fact mitigated it. They show that it has
been changes in the spatial distribution of labour demand that have mainly caused polarisation,
and that these changes have been similar across geographical neighbours, resulting in similar
unemployment outcomes.
Looking back at Figure 5 we can see the strong geographical component in the polarisation of
unemployment rates. Comparing the maps for 1986 and 1996 we can see clearly deﬁned clusters
of high and low unemployment emerging, and these extend not just across regions but often also
across countries. As a result national borders have become increasingly blurred. Overman and
Puga (2002) note that understanding this neighbours effect is crucial to understanding the polar-
isationoflabourdemandandunemploymentrates. Theyconsiderdifferentfactorsthatmighthave
resulted in similar changes in labour demand across neighbouring regions. These include the skill
composition of regional labour forces, and regional specialisation patterns. They ﬁnd that there is
a truly geographical component to the neighbour effect since, even after controlling for national
and regional characteristics, there is still a strong similarity in the unemployment outcomes of
neighbouring regions. Most surprisingly, this geographical component is as strong within as
across national borders. All of this suggests that the polarisation of regional unemployment rates
is the result of a spatial reorganisation of employment over this decade of deepening European
integration, with clusters of rising or falling employment extending across neighbouring regions
and even across neighbouring countries.
In order to help interpret the evolution of regional inequalities across Europe described in this
section and to better understand how it might be affected by further integration and regional
policies, we now turn to a brief review of some recent location theories.
3. Forces driving the new economic geography
Economic theory has traditionally explained differences in production structures mainly through
differences in underlying characteristics (endowments of natural resources, factors of production,
infrastructure, or technology), which make space itself uneven. In this framework, economic
integration leads regions to specialise according to their comparative advantage.
Comparative advantage, while relevant, provides a weak explanation for the remarkable spatial
concentration of activity. In order to explain the uneven geographical distribution of economic
activities across areas with similar endowments, we must consider increasing returns to scale
(Scotchmer and Thisse, 1992, call this the ‘folk theorem of spatial economics’). Models of trade with
increasing returns and imperfect competition provide an explanation as to why regions without
9signiﬁcant comparative advantage with respect to each other can develop different production
structures on the basis of their different market access.
The implications of these models for location, and the effects that reductions in trade or trans-
port costs have on it, are formalised by Krugman and Venables (1990). They start by assuming
that there are two regions: a large ‘core’ region and a small ‘peripheral’ region. There are two
factors of production, which are mobile across sectors but immobile across regions. The core
region has larger factor endowments than the peripheral region, although both have the same
relative endowments — hence there is no comparative advantage in the traditional sense. There
are two production sectors. One of these sectors is perfectly competitive and produces a freely
tradeable homogenous commodity under constant returns to scale. The other sector is imperfectly
competitive and has ﬁrms producing differentiated manufactures under increasing returns to
scale; they label this ‘manufacturing’.
It is hardly surprising that at equilibrium the core has a larger manufacturing sector than the
periphery. The interesting ﬁnding is that, for ﬁnite positive trade costs, the core’s share of industry
is larger than its share of endowments. It is therefore a net exporter of manufactures. This effect
is known as the ‘market access’ or ‘home market’ effect.6 Furthermore, each region’s share of
industry changes non-monotonically with trade costs. This is best seen by considering a process
of gradual reduction in trade costs between the two regions from prohibitively high to none, as
depictedinFigure6. Theverticalaxisistheshareofindustryineachregion, andthehorizontalaxis
plots trade costs (zero represents free trade, one represents trade costs equal to the producer price
of the product). In this example region 1 (the core) is assumed to have 60% of total endowments of
the two factors.
With high trade costs, ﬁrms sell mainly — but not only — in their local market. Then if a region
had many more ﬁrms relative to its market size than the other region, the greater competition or
crowdedness of that market would lead some local ﬁrms to exit, reducing differences in the size of
industry. As a result, each region’s share of industry is close to its share of endowments.
Economic integration increases the share of sales that each ﬁrm makes in the other region,
thereby weakening the effect of more local competitors on each ﬁrm’s market share. Yet increasing
returns imply that the larger sales of ﬁrms producing in the core give them higher proﬁts. If more
ﬁrms enter in response to those proﬁts, the size of industry in the core rises above its share of world
endowments.
However, as the size of industry in the core increases so does demand for local factors. For low
trade costs, rising factor prices start driving some ﬁrms out of the core, so further integration starts
reducing its share of industry. As the two regions approach costless trade it is increasingly factor
price differences that determine location, so differences in both nominal and real wages between
them tend to disappear, while each region’s share of industry tends to go back to its share of overall
6Davis (1998) introduces transport costs for the good produced under constant returns in a model similar to the one
describedhere, andshowsthatthisresultsinnoequilibriumtradeinthisgood, andhencenomarketaccesseffect. Fujita,
Krugman, and Venables (1999) show that re-establishing equilibrium trade in the constant returns good by having this
being differentiated across countries re-establishes the market access effect. Davis and Weinstein (1999) ﬁnd evidence of
market access effects for Japanese prefectures. For oecd countries they do not when they focus on pure national market
size, but they do when they consider a richer measure of market access (Davis and Weinstein, 1998).
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Figure 6. Trade costs and location in Krugman and Venables (1990)
endowments.
This type of trade model with imperfect competition highlights the fundamental ambiguity of
the effects of economic integration or reductions in transport costs on the relative attractiveness
of core and peripheral regions. However, like traditional theory, it still explains differences in
production structures through differences in underlying characteristics — in this case in terms of
exogenously given market size. The main contribution of the so-called ‘new economic geography’
(or ‘new geographical economics’) is the formalisation of mechanisms by which, even a priori
very similar regions, can end up with very different production structures and income levels.7
The simplest such mechanism arises when one introduces some mobile source of demand in the
framework just described.8
Endogenous core-periphery structures with labour mobility
Krugman (1991) shows that the interaction of labour migration across regions with increasing
returns and trade costs creates a tendency for ﬁrms and workers to cluster together as regions
integrate. If some factors are mobile between regions, then the pressure put on those factors by the
concentration of economic activities will be eased. Factor mobility can make the supply of factors
sufﬁciently elastic that small differences in the size of industry across regions can build up. Even if
7The review of the new economic geography in this section only aims to highlight some of the main mechanisms at
work andnot tosurveythe literature; it drawsfrom a morecomprehensive survey byOttaviano andPuga (1998). Martin
(1999c) and Neary (2001) provide critical reviews of this work. See also Fujita and Thisse (2000) for a complementary
survey of how this approach relates to work based on either technological externalities or spatial competition.












































Figure 7. Trade costs and location in Krugman (1991)
regions are a priori identical, they can become endogenously differentiated into an industrialised
core and a deindustrialised periphery.
Krugman (1991) considers two regions and two sectors: one monopolistically competitive, the
other perfectly competitive. There is no mobility of workers across sectors, and only industrial
workers are mobile across regions.9 Finally, the two regions are assumed a priori identical in every
respect, including their endowment of immobile factors.
To understand the forces at work it is useful to consider the following thought experiment.
Suppose that both regions have equal shares of industry but that, for some reason, one ﬁrm decides
to move production from one region to the other. How does this affect the proﬁtability of ﬁrms
in the region receiving the ﬁrm? The presence of one more ﬁrm puts additional pressure on the
productandlabourmarkets, andtendstomaketheﬁrmgobacktowhereitcamefrom. Iftherewas
no migration, this would be the end of the story and regions would remain identical. However,
the rise in the share of goods produced locally in the region receiving the ﬁrm (hence free from
trade costs) and the rise in local labour demand and wages tend to attract more workers. This
increases local expenditure and eases pressure in the labour market, so tends to attract more ﬁrms.
Whether the overall effect of entry is to increase the proﬁtability of local ﬁrms (encouraging further
entry), or to lower that proﬁtability (leading to exit), depends on parameters of the model, and in
9Introducing intersectoral mobility in Krugman’s 1991 model (but retaining some other immobile factor) does not
substantially change the results, but, by making labour supply to this sector more elastic, strengthens the tendency of
industry to agglomerate (Puga, 1998).
12particular on how integrated regions are.10
Figure 7 plots the share of industry in each region during a gradual reduction in trade costs
between the two regions. This shows that when trade costs fall below some critical value,
whichever of the two regions gets a slight advantage will build on it. The presence of more
industry attracts more workers due to higher wages and a lower cost of living. The presence of
more workers in turn attracts more ﬁrms through a market access effect. And this self-reinforcing
mechanism leads to an endogenous differentiation of the two a priori identical regions into an
industrialised core and a deindustrialised periphery.11
Low labour mobility in Europe
The cumulative causation mechanism modelled by Krugman (1991) relies on the assumption that,
when a region does relatively well in attracting ﬁrms, it is able to attract more workers on the basis
of higher wages and better access to a wider range of goods. Blanchard and Katz (1992) show
that in the us there is such an adjustment process working through regional migration. This is not
the case in Europe, where adjustment to changes in regional fortunes takes place mostly through
participation decisions (Decressin and Fatàs, 1995).
Migration rates in Europe are low in comparison with those of the us (Bentivogli and Pagano,
1999). They are also low by historical standards, especially when compared with the much higher
migration rates that characterised Europe in the 1960s.12 The Single European Act was set to create
a single market for goods and workers in the eu, yet only 1.5% of eu citizens live in a Member State
different from where they were born. Even within European countries, migration across regions
remains small. There is some disagreement as to whether this is the result of people being reluctant
to move, the incentives being insufﬁcient, or barriers to migration being too high.
Low mobility in Europe is often blamed on language and cultural barriers, or on Europeans
being immobile per se. Yet culture cannot easily explain low migration rates within European
countries, which in most cases do not have substantial internal language barriers. Nor can it
explain the dramatic fall in migration rates since the 1960s.
Migration rates could also be low because of lack of incentives. This may seem an unlikely
explanation given that, as discussed in Section 2, there are large differences across European
regions both in terms of income and unemployment rates. Yet in many European countries
interregional wage differences for similar jobs are relatively small, an issue we shall return to
below. Nevertheless, Bentolila (1997) argues that in the case of Spain the importance of wage
convergence for the decline in migration is likely to be small, given the almost nil elasticity of
migrationwithrespecttointerregionalwagedifferentials(BentolilaandDolado,1991). Faini, Galli,
10For the effects of changes in other parameters, see Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002). They develop an al-
ternative speciﬁcation of Krugman’s (1991) model with quadratic instead of ces utility, which allows them to better
disentangle the different effects.
11Since regions are a priori identical, which region becomes the industrialised ‘core’ and which the ‘periphery’ when
they endogenously differentiate is not determined by endowments, but instead by history — and, in extensions to this
model (see, for instance, Ottaviano, 1999), by expectations.
12See Braunerhjelm, Faini, Norman, Ruane, and Seabright (2000) for a careful discussion of labour mobility in Europe,
and de la Fuente (1999) for a literature review and some novel results for Spain.
13Gennari, and Rossi (1997) argue that the same is true for Italy. Nominal wage equalisation there
was largely achieved at the end of the 1960s following a union agreement to abolish regional wage
differentials. Yet the decline in migration has continued steadily.
Even with similar wages, differences in the probability of ﬁnding a job still result in interre-
gional differences in expected income. Empirical studies tend to ﬁnd zero responsiveness of inter-
regional migration in Europe to unemployment differentials (Bentivogli and Pagano, 1999). But de
la Fuente (1999) ﬁnds that when one considers more sophisticated measures of the probability of
ﬁnding a job than the usual one minus the unemployment rate, people are much more responsive
to differences in this probability. This suggests that one of the main reasons why there is not more
migration in Europe is that the high average unemployment rate makes the probability of ﬁnding a
jobanywheretoolowtomakeitworthwhiletomove(Braunerhjelmetal.,2000). Also, inefﬁciencies
in the job-matching process may result in a much lower probability of being hired outside one’s
own region. Faini et al. (1997) cite evidence from Casavola and Sestito (1995) showing that Italy’s
unemployed rely largely on the networks of family and friends to ﬁnd a job. Such networks are
much less effective outside the region where the unemployed are located. Faini et al. (1997) ﬁnd
this to be a key reason for the low propensity to migrate across Italian regions: those amongst
the unemployed in the Mezzogiorno who rely more heavily on family and friends to ﬁnd a job
are also much less likely to migrate. Monfort and Ottaviano (2000) formalise the link between
the efﬁciency of the job matching process and agglomeration and suggests that, if labour markets
function more efﬁciently in areas where ﬁrms agglomerate, then differences in unemployment
rates across regions may be very persistent.
A low probability of ﬁnding a job outside one’s own region, be it due to high unemployment
rates or inefﬁciencies in job-matching is clearly only part of the story. When the unemployed are
asked as part of the Spanish labour force survey whether they would take a job away from their
place of residence if offered one, only 33.2% answer yes (in 1997, down from 44.6% in 1987) (Pérez
and Serrano, 1998).
Rising incomes may have made people more sensitive over time to amenities in their place of
residence (de la Fuente, 1999). Family and government support could also help explain the decline
in the propensity to migrate (Attanasio and Padoa-Schioppa, 1991). According to this argument,
youngpeople, whotypicallyconstitutethebulkofmigrants, arelesswillingtomovebecauserising
family income has strengthened family support when unemployed. While this argument makes
sense, there are forces working in the opposite direction. Migration is a costly investment and
rising family income can help ﬁnance it more easily. Faini et al. (1997) ﬁnd that in Italy this second
effect tends to dominate: higher household income (proxied by the family’s employment rate)
increases rather than decreases the propensity to migrate. At the same time, distortions introduced
by certain government beneﬁts may be important. Antolín and Bover (1997) ﬁnd that in Spain
those amongst the unemployed receiving beneﬁts (as proxied by being registered unemployed)
are signiﬁcantly less likely to migrate.
Finally, the costs of housing transactions and the difﬁculties of ﬁnding a rented accommodation
can also play a prominent role in discouraging interregional mobility. Oswald (1996) argues that













































Figure 8. Trade costs and location in Puga (1999)
In the case of the uk, McCormick (1997) discusses how rising housing prices in the faster growing
regions tend to discourage interregional migration.
Endogenous core-periphery structures without labour mobility
What do new economic geography models have to say about the relationship between trade
costs and regional inequalities if migration does not occur, be it due to lack of mobility or to the
incentives to move not materialising?
Venables (1996) addresses this question by arguing that ﬁrms beneﬁt from being close to each
other not only because of linkages working through the supply of labour and demand for goods
from each others workers, but also because of direct input-output linkages amongst themselves.
He shows that vertical linkages between upstream and downstream industries, when both of them
are imperfectly competitive, can play a role equivalent to that of labour migration in endogenously
determining the size of the market at different regions.
Krugman and Venables (1995) pick up this argument, and formalise it in a framework more
directly comparable to that in Krugman (1991). Cumulative causation arises in a similar way in
both papers. In Krugman (1991) an increase in the number of ﬁrms in a location increases demand
fortheoutputoflocalﬁrmsthroughtheexpenditureoftheworkersattractedfromotherregions. In
Krugman and Venables (1995) there is no interregional mobility, so workers must be drawn from
other sectors instead, and the higher demand comes from expenditure on intermediates by the
newly arrived ﬁrms. In addition to this demand linkage, in Krugman and Venables (1995) there is
a cost linkage arising from the saving in trade costs on a larger fraction of their intermediate inputs
15by ﬁrms in the larger market (these demand and cost linkages can be seen as a formalisation of
Hirschman’s, 1958, backward and forward linkages).13
The relationship between transport costs and agglomeration, however, becomes more complex
without labour migration. If agglomeration does not increase interregional wage gaps (which
in the context of Krugman and Venables, 1995, simply requires that at equilibrium all countries
keep some constant returns to scale production), things work as in Krugman (1991): a fall in
trade costs below some critical level leads industry to concentrate in a single region. However,
if the concentration of industry in some regions tends to make their wages relatively higher, the
lack of interregional labour mobility can make the relationship between regional integration and
industrial agglomeration non-monotonic, so close enough integration can trigger the industrial
take-off of less developed regions.14
This Ω-shaped relationship between transport costs and agglomeration is studied by Puga
(1999), with a uniﬁed framework in which both interregional migration and input-output linkages
may drive agglomeration.15 He ﬁnds that the lack of interregional mobility introduces two main
differences in the relationship between economic integration and regional inequalities, which are
illustrated in Figure 8.
First, comparison of outcomes with and without interregional migration shows that agglomer-
ation gets an extra kick from the relocation of workers towards locations with higher real wages.
On the other hand, if workers do not move, wage differences persist and act as a dispersion force
by increasing production costs for ﬁrms producing in locations with relatively many other ﬁrms.
This dispersion force can moderate agglomeration and sustain non-extreme equilibria in which all
regions have industry, even if in different proportions. Thus the lack of interregional mobility both
postpones agglomeration in a process of regional integration and weakens it when it happens.
One straightforward implication of this is that lower mobility in Europe together with higher
barriers to trade can play an important role in explaining why non-agricultural employment is less
geographically concentrated in Europe than in the us but income disparities are wider across eu
regions than across us States.
The second difference introduced by the lack of mobility is the non-monotonicity in the relation-
ship between trade costs and agglomeration. With zero trade costs each ﬁrm ﬁnds no advantage in
locating close to the rest of industry and locates in the region with lowest wages; therefore, if wages
are increasing in industrial employment, for trade costs sufﬁciently close to zero agglomeration in
one region cannot be an equilibrium. Krugman and Venables (1995) illustrate this with examples
in which for low trade costs some ﬁrms relocate from the industrial agglomeration to regions with
lower wages, but not to the extent of allowing full convergence between a priori identical regions.
Puga (1999) shows that, more generally, for high trade costs ﬁrms are split between the identically
endowed regions to meet ﬁnal demand; for intermediate trade costs regional disparities open up
as some regions attract more industry than others (but not necessarily to the extent of absorbing
13If these linkages affect the r&d sector, they can become intertemporal and increase the rate of growth (Martin and
Ottaviano, 2001).
14Helpman (1997) shows that the price of non-tradable goods can similarly act as a dispersion force.
15The framework captures Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), and Puga (1998), as well as some novel
cases, in a single model.
16all of industry); for low trade costs agglomeration unravels as the share of industry in regions with
lower wages increases gradually (early entrants look for lower prices of immobile factors relative
to more industrialised regions; later, as a critical mass of ﬁrms is created in some sectors, more
ﬁrms move in to exploit forward and backward linkages).
In a multi-country version of Krugman and Venables (1995) motivated by the experience of
European integration, Puga and Venables (1997) ﬁnd that the formation of a customs union has
location effects that beneﬁt the union as a whole, as ﬁrms ﬁnd it increasingly advantageous to
serve the common market from inside (Baldwin and Venables, 1995, call this a ‘production shifting’
effect). However, such gains are unevenly distributed between the integrating countries, with
early stages of integration opening up differences in production structures and real income levels
between the integrating countries, and later stages leading to convergence.
The Ω-shaped relationship between integration and agglomeration of many of these models
couldbeinterpretedtosuggestthat, duetolowinterregionallabourmobility, Europeanintegration
may by itself cause regional convergence both in terms of real wages and of production structures.
However, the ability of poorer regions to catch up in this context relies on integration going far
enough (during intermediate stages of integration the model predicts possibly large interregional
real wage disparities), on similar endowments in terms of skill and technologies, and on a ﬂexible
response of wages to changes in industrial employment. Making sure these criteria are met is
essential to achieve convergence.
With respect to the last point is worth noting that institutional constraints limit interregional
wage differentials within European countries. German reuniﬁcation led to a sharp reduction in
regional wage differences between the Eastern and Western Lander. According to Akerlof, Rose,
Yellen, and Hessenius (1991), wages in the East rose by 42% between the ﬁrst quarter of 1990
and October of that same year. This rise occurred while migration was small and falling, and
was largely due to strong union bargaining for wage equalisation on the grounds of preventing
large scale migration, and the perception on the part of workers that higher unemployment in the
East did not justify lower wages.16 In Italy and Spain, wage setting at the national level limits the
responsiveness of wages to regional economic conditions (on this respect, see Jimeno and Bentolila,
1998, who stress the impact on the regional structure of wages in Spain of wage ﬂoors set at the
national sectoral level). The rebates on social security contributions introduced in Southern Italy
to create some labour cost differences have done so along a very coarse geographical partition
(North-South) and without improving the responsiveness to local conditions, so have not offset
rigidities in the wage setting process. They are now being eliminated following an agreement with
the European Commission.
Puga (1999) suggests that the combination of minimal interregional migration with wage set-
ting at the national sectoral level may help understand the rise in income inequalities between
16The equalisation of social security contributions also contributed towards rapid wage equalisation. While the one to
one conversion rate between Ostmarks and Deutschmark has also been blamed, this is not a compelling reason. As Bean
(1992) puts it, ‘[w]ould things really have been different if a conversion rate of, say, 10 Ostmarks to the Deutschmark
had been chosen? While much of the East German industry might have been viable at that rate, it would have remained
so only as long as East German workers were willing to accept the corresponding low real wages. [...] At the end of the
day the problem is that East German workers want a West German standard of living, which East German capital is not
presently capable of delivering.’
17European regions within each country over the last 15 years at the same time as inequalities
between countries have fallen. In the models discussed above, when agglomeration does not
get reﬂected in wage differentials, agglomeration increases monotonically with integration. If the
structure of wages in Europe reﬂects differences in local conditions between countries more than
differences between regions within each country, further European integration could reinforce the
current trend: peripheral countries catching up in their average income to core countries, while
poorer regions keep falling behind (see also Faini, 1999, for a formalisation of this argument
which explicitly incorporates union behaviour). If agglomeration does not get reﬂected in wage
differences, it may get reﬂected instead in differences in unemployment rates. Since clusters of
activity may extend across several administrative units, this can result in clusters of high and low
unemployment extending across regional and even national borders.
Onestylisedfactwehavenotrelatedtothemodelsdiscussedsofarisdivergingindustrialstruc-
tures. However, in order to study the relationship between trade costs and sectoral agglomeration,
one needs to consider a more detailed input-output structure.
Agglomeration and regional specialisation
Krugman and Venables (1996) consider a setup like that in Krugman and Venables (1995), with one
main difference: the two production sectors are imperfectly competitive, and ﬁrms in each sector
sell and buy a higher proportion of intermediates to and from ﬁrms in the same sector than to and
from ﬁrms in the other sector. This introduces an important difference with respect to Krugman
and Venables (1995): if one more ﬁrm locates in a region, the beneﬁcial cost and demand linkages
affect more intensely ﬁrms in the same sector, while the increased product and labour market
competition harms ﬁrms in both sectors equally (Henderson, 1974, uses a similar argument to
explain city specialisation). As a result, a fall in trade costs below some critical level leads each
region to become specialised in the production of one sector.
Venables (1999) extends the model in Krugman and Venables (1996) to a continuum of imper-
fectly competitive sectors and a perfectly competitive sector. He then asks what proportion of
sectors will be located in each of the two regions when agglomeration occurs. With just two sectors
the answer was one industry in each region, this meaning that both regions have the same income
levels. But with many industries the division need not be half and half. One region can have more
industries than the other, this leading to real income differences between regions. What Venables
shows is that there are bounds to sustainable regional differences, and that the maximum share
of total industry that one region can capture ﬁrst increases and then decreases during a process of
regional integration. However, because within those bounds the actual division of sectors between
regions is indeterminate, there are strong incentives for each region to try to secure the maximum
possible number of sectors.
Most trade models predict that specialisation will increase with reductions in trade or transport
costs. What distinguishes new economic geography models in this respect is the fact that even
similar regions or countries can develop very different specialisation patterns. This provides a
justiﬁcation for the increasing differences in production structures across different core countries
as well as across different peripheral countries in Europe described in Section 2.
18Having discussed how some recent location theories can help understand the evolution of
regional inequalities in Europe, we now turn to the policies that aim to affect that evolution.
4. European regional policies
The main instrument of eu regional policy, the Structural Funds are articulated around three
‘objectives’. Objective1is‘promotingthedevelopmentandstructuraladjustmentofregionswhose
development is lagging behind’. Objective 2 is ‘supporting the economic and social conversion of
areas facing structural difﬁculties’. Objective 3 is ‘supporting the adaptation and modernisation
of policies and systems of education, training and employment’. Of the €195,000 million (at 1999
prices) allocated to the Structural Funds in the 2000–2006 budget, 69.7% is allocated to objective 1.
The nuts 2 regions eligible under objective 1 are those with a Gross Domestic Product per capita
below 75% of the eu average. The Cohesion Fund is to provide another €18,000 million over the
period 2000–2006, in this case for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
Despite the articulation of European regional funds under different objectives, it is not always
clear what the aims are. The ﬁrst and fundamental issue for a good design of regional policies
is to deﬁne the objectives clearly. Do we want a homogenisation across space of certain aggregate
measures(suchasincomepercapita, unemploymentoremploymentrates, orhealthandeducation
indicators)? Or is the objective one of personal fairness, similar people having similar opportunit-
ies in different places?
The two objectives are related but do not necessarily go in the same direction. The case of the
United Kingdom provides a good example. Since the early 1980s there has been a sharp divergence
of both average real and average nominal earnings across uk regions. However, Duranton and
Monastiriotis (2002) show that individual earnings for people with similar characteristics (such
as sex, education and experience) have steadily converged. The fundamental reason underlying
aggregate divergence in the British case is the combination of three factors: a rise in the premium
to education, an increase in the geographical concentration of more educated people in London
and the South-East, and a convergence of the premium to education which was initially lower in
these two regions. Had the premium to education and interregional differences in this premium
remained stable, the so-called North-South divide would have decreased rather than increased
(Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2002).
While it is important to distinguish between these two possible objectives, regional policies
have a role to play even when the main objective is reducing personal rather than regional in-
equalities. This is because, as highlighted by recent location theories, regional interactions can
have important effects on individual outcomes. Furthermore, there are limits to the amount of
personal redistribution that can be achieved by more direct means.
Clarifying the objectives of regional policies is only a ﬁrst step. One then needs to look for
optimal policies to achieve those objectives. Before considering possible instruments, this requires
deciding on the direction of intervention. Is the amount of regional heterogeneity delivered in the
absence of regional policies too high or too low? The general presumption is that policy should aim
to reduce regional inequalities by focusing on poorer regions. However, the extent to which this
19should happen is far from clear. Seeking full spatial homogeneity would obviously be absurd, but
howfarshouldpolicyaimtogo? Evenintheabsenceofagglomerationeffects, thesamedifferences
in endowments, technology and geography that can help make some regions richer may also make
public investments more productive in those places. De la Fuente (2001) studies this issue for the
case of Spain and ﬁnds that the allocation of public infrastructures across Spanish nuts 2 regions
has been too redistributive, even if one considers a high degree of aversion to inequality.
Agglomeration effects further complicate this matter. The location theories reviewed in the
previous section highlight the potential efﬁciency gains from the clustering of activity. If there
is sufﬁcient mobility, agglomeration need not be incompatible with a convergence of income and
unemployment rates. With little mobility, on the other hand, reducing regional inequalities may
involve giving up some of the gains from agglomeration (see Martin, 1999a,b, for an elaboration
of this argument). The idea that regional policies should aim to disperse activity with respect to
the market outcomes indicates a presumption that market outcomes are characterised by too much
concentration. However, there are forces pushing in opposite directions. There is a tendency for
too much agglomeration, since when ﬁrms and workers move they do not take into account the
possible losses for those left behind. And there is a tendency for too little agglomeration, since
when ﬁrms and workers move they only take into account their own beneﬁt and not the beneﬁts
they bring for other ﬁrms and their impact on aggregate growth. Similar reasoning applies to
the congestion that ﬁrms and workers may impose on others in the same region. Thus, there is
no general indication of the direction in which governments should push with regional policies
when seeking efﬁciency. Even in terms of equity, the direction of policy is not obvious. Martin
and Ottaviano (1999) show in the context of a new economic geography model with endogenous
growth, that policies that increase agglomeration may nevertheless make those that remain in
poorer regions better off by raising the rate of growth. Combes and Linnemer (2000) show in
the context of a location model à la Hotelling that policies that induce asymmetries in the location
of production may help consumers everywhere by intensifying competition and lowering prices.
Turning to the instruments of European regional policy, similar proportions of the Structural
Funds allocation are devoted to training, subsidies to enterprises, and infrastructure investments.
New economic geography models have little to say with respect to training, since most of these
models do not incorporate human capital accumulation. One of the few conclusions they offer
on this aspect is that, since training facilitates innovation and knowledge diffusion, it can both
increase aggregate growth and reduce regional inequalities (Martin, 1999b). Training can also be
important in the context of increasing sectoral specialisation. Most trade models predict that spe-
cialisation will increase with integration and reductions in transport costs. What distinguishes new
economic geography models in this respect is the observation that the pattern of specialisation may
not be driven by traditional comparative advantage considerations but instead by self-reinforcing
agglomeration. While specialisation will increase the need for schemes designed to help workers
withstand adjustment, the focus of such training schemes is not straightforward. It can be hard to
distinguish permanent from temporary shocks on a certain sector. And the skills needed to survive
each type of shock are very different. While sector-speciﬁc skills can help withstand temporary
shocks by building a regions ‘depth of comparative advantage’, it is general skills that will help
20workers adapt in the face of permanent shocks.
Regarding subsidies to enterprises, new economic geography models analyse in detail some
of the externalities that arise from the location of individual ﬁrms, which affect those in other
regions. As usual in the presence of externalities, this implies that there is a trade-off between
centralisation or coordination to internalise these externalities as well as those that might arise
from competition between governments, and decentralisation to exploit the better knowledge of
local jurisdictions, and gains from competition and diversity. The multiplicity of equilibria in new
economic geography models also highlights that the distribution of activities we observe is just
one of many possible outcomes, so that individual governments may have incentives to push for
certain outcomes that favour them but not necessarily other governments or aggregate welfare.
Also, governments may be tempted to contain industrial change. Looking back at Figure 1, the
1970s stand out as a period in which neither countries already in the European Community nor
new entrants experienced a clear increase in their industrial specialisation. One possible interpret-
ation is that specialisation was stiﬂed by the particularly strong industrial policy interventions that
characterised Europe over that decade.
A small number of papers have started to look at taxes and subsidies in the context of new eco-
nomic geography models (Andersson and Forslid, 1999; Kind, Midelfart Knarvik, and Schjelderup,
2000; Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2000).17 The main conclusion from this
line of work is that the beneﬁts of agglomeration make ﬁrms less sensitive to taxes and thus allow
jurisdictions where ﬁrms cluster to tax them more heavily (Andersson and Forslid, 1999; Kind
et al., 2000). An additional implication is that tax harmonisation may beneﬁt neither rich nor poor
regions: it can make rich regions lose tax revenue while making it more difﬁcult for poor regions
to attract industry (Baldwin and Krugman, 2000). This is an area where more work is needed. An
important limitation of most existing models arises from their very simple nature, which results
in the kind of extreme behaviour shown in Figure 7: a large change in parameters (be it trade
costs, taxes or subsidies) may have no effect on location, and then a small additional change may
lead to a catastrophic transformation in which industry goes from being evenly split across regions
to being completely clustered in a single region. More realistic models with, for instance, general
equilibrium wage effects (Puga, 1999) or heterogeneous tastes for amenities (Murata, 2001; Tabuchi
and Thisse, 2002) exhibit the smoother behaviour shown in Figure 8. Then a government can no
longer raise taxes without losing some ﬁrms, although agglomeration will still mitigate the loss.
While new economic geography models still have little to say on training or subsidies to
enterprises, their focus on the relationship between transport costs, agglomeration, and regional
inequalities makes these models particularly appropriate to study the role of improvements in
transport infrastructure.
17See Besley and Seabright (1999); Braunerhjelm et al. (2000) for two recent studies of state aids from a wider perspect-
ive.
215. Transport infrastructure as a regional policy instrument
The European Commission sees transport infrastructure improvements as playing ‘a key role in
efforts to reduce regional and social disparities in the European Union and in the strengthening
of its economic and social cohesion’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1999). The
Commission is thus promoting the development of a Trans-European Transport Network (ten-t).
This includes 14 priority projects, endorsed by the Essen European Council of December 1994, and
a large number of smaller projects. Preliminary estimates put the total cost at over €300,000 million
(at 1993 prices). Projects developed as part of the ten-t are eligible for substantial Community
support, particularly in the ‘Cohesion’ Member States (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). The
eu budget for 1995–1999 devoted a total of €2,300 million to the ten-t. In the 2001–2006 budget
the ﬁgure was doubled to €4,600 million. National governments will also devote substantial sums
to transport infrastructure. For instance, public infrastructure investments in Spain, mostly for
transport, are expected to amount to 2.7% of gdp annually over 2000–2006.
An explicit motivation behind these large investments is the view of transport infrastructure
as one more input into the production process. Thus, increasing the stock of infrastructure in
less developed regions, like increasing any other stock of capital, is bound to help these regions
grow closer to more developed ones. This view underlies a large number of econometric exercises
estimating aggregate production functions in which public capital enters as an input. Early exer-
cises of this sort (Aschauer, 1989) reach the implausible result that one more unit of government
capital pays for itself by means of higher aggregate output in less than a year. In the us and
in other industrialised countries the rate of public investment in infrastructure fell after the late
1960s and the rate of productivity growth fell shortly afterwards. However, concluding from this
that the productivity slowdown was caused by a slowdown in infrastructure investment is quite
a leap. Even if there is a causal relationship, it is not clear in which direction it runs. Perhaps
it was having a sustained period of growth that facilitated large infrastructure investments and
not the other way around. Moreover, even if infrastructure investments did increase the rate of
growth, this does not imply that further investments will, particularly given that, when building
a transport network, the most beneﬁcial links tend to be built ﬁrst. More recent contributions
in the macroeconomics literature, exploiting cross-sectional detail and using careful econometrics
ﬁnd more modest returns to infrastructure investment (see Gramlich, 1994; de la Fuente, 2000, for
reviews).
Studying the effects of infrastructure investments by estimating aggregate production func-
tions, when done carefully, can give us an idea of the impact of an investment on infrastructure
of ‘average past quality’. While useful, this is not always a good indication of the likely impact of
future infrastructure investments. This observation is particularly relevant for Europe where, as
discussed below, the focus of infrastructure investments is shifting from roads to high-speed rail.
A more micro approach allows us to look at the details of speciﬁc projects, and at the same time to
consider that its role in transporting goods and people across space gives transport infrastructure
very different properties relative to other forms of capital. The remainder of this section discusses
some of those properties and their consequences for regional inequalities.
22What are the effects of an improvement in transport infrastructure? The ﬁrst impact of a
transport project comes from the construction expenditure. Given the sums involved, this is not
negligible. A transport project also generates costs and revenues associated with its operation.
Further, it also has a direct impact on regions affected, typically by reducing the cost and increasing
the quality of transport between them; this in turn induces changes in the total number of journeys
undertaken, and in the way in which these are split between different modes of transport. All
of these effects, together with the environmental impact, are normally considered as part of the
economic evaluation of projects.
It is therefore instructive to look at the cost-beneﬁt analysis of some recent transport infra-
structure projects in Europe. A noteworthy aspect is the shift of emphasis in European transport
infrastructure investment from roads to high-speed rail. In 1996–1997, both modes of transport
represented similar shares of ten-t investment, each taking about €15,000 million. Almost two
thirds of railway investment went to high-speed routes. The focus is now shifting towards rail
— so much so that, on the whole, rail investments within the ten-t framework are expected to
amount to €185,000 million (at 1993 prices), more than twice as much as roads, and over six times
as much as airports.
This in itself reﬂects one of the characteristics of high-speed rail: its high sunk infrastructure
cost, as compared to conventional rail and roads. Track costs of the only high-speed rail line built
in Spain prior to the ten-t (Madrid-Sevilla) were about €6.5 million (at 1993 prices) per kilometre.
De Rus and Inglada (1997) perform an ex-post evaluation of this line. Since the Madrid-Sevilla
line started its operations in 1992, it has taken a large fraction of passenger transport away from
both car and air transport. Yet de Rus and Inglada’s (1997) careful cost-beneﬁt analysis arrives
at a negative net present value of the project of at least €2,300 million (at 1993 prices) for an
infrastructure investment of roughly the same amount. More broadly, Nash (1991) casts a skeptical
view of the overall beneﬁts versus costs of high-speed rail proposals.
Traditionally cost-beneﬁt analysis does not try to assess the impact of transport projects on
regional economic development. This approach of looking only at those activities more directly
related to the project can be enough to get an accurate evaluation, provided that two conditions
are met: ﬁrst, that distortions and market failures are not signiﬁcant, so that private and public
valuations are not too different; second, that the changes in levels of activity induced by the project
fadeawayfairlyrapidlyaswemoveawayfromthoseactivitiesmorecloselyrelatedtoit. However,
these conditions are often not met. There has been increasing realisation throughout economics
that wide ranges of economic activities may be affected by market failure and distortions. And the
type of cumulative causation mechanisms modelled by the new economic geography can make
the effects of a project be ampliﬁed rather than dampened as they spread through the economy.
For high-speed rail these sorts of additional effects may not be very important. High-speed rail
lines are generally not suitable for the transport of goods, and are thus unlikely to have much effect
on the location of industry. Even traditional rail accounts for a relatively small fraction of goods
transport in the eu: about 8% (in terms of tons×kilometre), as compared with about 40% in the
23us.18 At the same time, high-speed rail may have larger effects on the location of business services
and headquarters. Duranton and Puga (2001) suggest that the resulting increase in the ability
to provide business and headquarter services to remote locations may lead to the concentration
of business services and headquarters in a few large urban centres. This would raise costs in
those centres and drive away production establishments, specially to smaller cities and towns.
As a result, there might be a shift in the main dimension along which cities specialise, from a
specialisation by sector to a specialisation by function. Duranton and Puga (2001) provide some
evidence of such a shift taking place in the us. In France, there is some informal evidence that
the construction of the Paris-Lyon high-speed rail line led to the relocation of headquarters from
Lyon to Paris. And in Spain, there are concerns that the Madrid-Barcelona high-speed rail line may
reinforce the process of headquarter relocation towards the capital (Vives, 2001).
Road infrastructure, being more heavily used to ship goods, is likely to have larger effects
on the spatial allocation of production, and hence on regional inequalities. These sorts of effect
have recently been used to justify the use of transport infrastructure investments as one of the
main instruments of regional policy. According to Europe’s Committee of the Regions ‘transport
should not be judged on strictly economic criteria (economic viability), but considered in the
context of a broader socio-economic and environmental analysis. In this respect, it is important to
highlight that if lack of or inadequate basic services are not offset by an efﬁcient transport network
that diminishes the adverse effects of such deﬁciencies by providing access for the population of
isolated or disadvantaged regions, this will serve to increase depopulation and reduce economic
activity, thus hampering returns on transport investment. The result is a vicious circle in which
the growing lack of supply generates a growing lack of demand and vice versa’ (Committee of the
Regions, 2000).
One should not forget, however, that roads generally have lanes going both ways, and high-
speed train lines also have tracks going both ways. A better connection between two regions with
different development levels not only gives ﬁrms in a less developed region better access to the
inputs and markets of more developed regions. It also makes it easier for ﬁrms in richer regions
to supply poorer regions at a distance, and can thus harm the industrialisation prospects of less
developed areas.
New economic geography models not only point out this potential ambiguity in the impact of
lower transport costs on less developed regions, they also tell us that the overall effect depends not
just on characteristics of the projects, but also on certain aspects of the economic environment. For
instance, if there is little interregional migration, and if wages do not vary much between regions
— even when regions differ widely in their attractiveness to ﬁrms — then investments in infra-
structure can do little to help poorer regions catch up, and may even widen their lag with respect
to richer regions. This is not just a theoretical possibility. Faini (1983) has convincingly argued
that the reduction in transport costs between Northern and Southern Italy in the 1950s deprived
ﬁrms in the Mezzogiorno from the protection they had previously enjoyed, and accelerated the
deindustrialisation process in Southern Italy.
18There might nevertheless be an indirect effect if the development of high-speed rail lines with separate tracks frees
capacity for freight transport on traditional rail lines
24Source: Gutiérrez and Urbano (1996)
Figure 9. Accessibility by road, 1992 and 2002
Of course, the effects of a transport project on the spatial allocation of production depend
crucially on the speciﬁc details of the project. New economic geography models explicitly capture
the role of transport infrastructure in facilitating trade, and in doing so make it possible to dis-
criminate between similarly-sized projects facilitating different types of trade, or interconnecting
places in different ways. Martin and Rogers (1995) were the ﬁrst to focus explicitly on the role
of infrastructure in a new economic geography framework (and to take into account the costs of
ﬁnancing it). They distinguish between projects that facilitate trade within a region, and those that
facilitate trade between regions. While improvements in interregional infrastructure may harm
rather than help peripheral regions — for the reasons discussed above — improvements in local
infrastructure in the peripheral regions lack such negative effects. Another important distinction
is between hub-and-spoke interconnections, in which places are connected by routes going via
a common centre or hub, and multilateral connections in which places are connected pairwise
with routes of similar quality. Puga and Venables (1997) and Fujita and Mori (1996) study this
distinction in the context of new economic geography models. They show that hub-and-spoke
networks promote agglomeration in the hub of the network, as ﬁrms located there face lower
transport costs to spoke locations than ﬁrms in one spoke to another. Furthermore, they also tend
to trigger disparities between spoke regions.
There is evidence that the road and high-speed rail networks being built as part of the ten-
t programme are likely to generate this kind of hub effect. Gutiérrez and Urbano (1996) study
changes in accessibility19 as a result the trans-European road network. Their results are illustrated
in Figure 9, with greater accessibility represented by lighter shades. Much of the area of the eu
gains better access to the main activity centres as a result of the trans-European road network, and
some of the biggest absolute changes in accessibility take place in peripheral regions which start
with very low levels of transport infrastructure. However, the gap in relative accessibility between
the areas with the best and the worst initial accessibility increases as a result of the network.
19They measure accessibility using the gdp-weighted sum of the impedances (quality-adjusted times of travel) to all
nodes.
25Source: Vickerman, Spiekermann, and Wegener (1999)
Figure 10. Daily accessibility by rail, 1993 and 2010
In a related study, Vickerman et al. (1999) analyse how the ten-t for high-speed rail will change
the relative locational advantage of different parts of the European continent. The two maps in
Figure 10 (from Vickerman et al., 1999) plot daily accessibility surfaces, drawn so that the height
of the surface at a particular point of the map is proportional to the population that can be
reached from that particular point by a return rail trip made during a working day with some
minimum stay in the destination (essentially population within ﬁve hours of train travel). This
seems a particularly appropriate accessibility indicator for high-speed rail travel, since this mode
of transport is specially relevant for the business service sector. The map on the left-hand side is
drawn for the existing European rail network in 1993, and the map on the right-hand side for the
European rail network planned for 2010. Two main conclusions emerge from Figure 10.
First, we can see once again the hub effect at work. The growth in accessibility of cities in
the European core is several times larger than that of cities at the European periphery. Naturally,
when major cities get connected through high-speed rail lines, cities located more centrally get
better access to nearly everywhere whereas in more peripheral locations the improvement is felt
mostly in the access to nearby locations. This has led the European Commission to acknowledge
that ‘[i]n transport policy, cohesion countries stand to gain in absolute terms from trans-European
networks but not necessarily in relative terms’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1996).
Second, the introduction of new high-speed lines leads to strongly non-monotonic changes
in accessibility, and creates large differences in accessibility within small distances. While the
population that can be reached within ﬁve hours by train greatly increases, differences on this
respect between the core and the periphery as well as between the main cities and smaller cities or
rural areas increase. Only cities that are nodes of the high-speed rail network gain accessibility,
while the areas in between nodes and those not on the network or at its edges do not. This
highlights an important difference between investments in high-speed rail and roads.
26One of the characteristics that distinguishes high-speed rail from other forms of transport is its
strong nodal aspect. Too many stops and a high-speed train ceases being high-speed. In many
cases intermediate stops continue to be served by slower local trains. Another distinguishing
characteristic of high-speed rail is the large magnitude of sunk infrastructure costs relative to
operating costs. Both these characteristics are important for the spatial organisation of production.
It is a well known result in location economics (see Beckmann and Thisse, 1986) that places that
lie in between the main nodes of a network are unattractive locations for production. Further,
transport technologies that exhibit increasing returns to scale, as is the case with high-speed rail,
are unlikely to promote new centres of production even on nodes of the network.20
The last two ﬁgures presented illustrate how changes in transport infrastructure lead to changes
in accessibility. To ﬁnd the effects on regional inequalities requires one further connection, linking
changes in accessibility with changes in the spatial allocation of economic activities. A few recent
papers have built on new economic geography models to study this connection. Venables and
Gasiorek (1999) develop a methodology for quantifying the general equilibrium effects of speciﬁc
projects, which is meant to complement more traditional cost beneﬁt analysis. They calibrate a new
economic geography model with data for eu regions and use it to evaluate the impact of several
road projects ﬁnanced by the Cohesion Fund. Results are presented in the form of multipliers,
which give the real income effects generated relative to the direct impact of a project. The main
advantage of this approach for project evaluation is the detailed microeconomic structure incor-
porated into the analysis. The main disadvantage is that this structure is imposed and not subject
to econometric testing. Their analysis shows that sometimes a project in a single region can have
strong welfare effects rippling through numerous regions. This is the case of the completion of the
m-40 ring road around Madrid: because it acts as a link for some of the main Spanish motorways
it has strong spillover effects throughout the regions in Spain and Portugal. Some other projects
in a single region can instead have very localised effects. This is the case of the Tagus crossing in
Lisbon: because it improves mainly local transport costs, its effects are small outside the Lisbon
region. Even projects connecting different regions can have relatively concentrated effects. For
instance, the Rías Baixas motorway, connecting Galicia with the Spanish Meseta, creates gains
concentrated mainly in Galicia.
A related exercise is carried out by Combes and Lafourcade (2001) who study the locational
effects of changes in transport costs in France. First they carefully assemble an extremely detailed
data set on changes in transport costs, and ﬁnd that on average transport costs within France
declined by 38% between 1978 and 1993. Surprisingly, infrastructure improvements only accoun-
ted for 7.5% of this reduction, the remaining 92.5% being due to changes in fuel consumption,
maintenance, and drivers’ costs. Then they estimate a new economic geography model to relate
these changes in transport costs to changes in employment, and ﬁnd that reductions in transport
costs have increased the geographic concentration of employment in France.
20The Hakimi Theorem (Hakimi, 1964, Guelicher, 1965) states that any location minimising total transport costs
for a producer must be a node of the network and not an intermediate point. In an extension to this theorem,
Louveaux, Thisse, and Beguin (1982) show that increasing returns to scale in transport technologies exclude from the
cost-minimising set of locations those nodes that are not already large markets for the product in question, or important
input sources in the case of resource-driven activities.
276. Conclusions
Despite large regional policy expenditures, regional inequalities in Europe have not narrowed
substantially over the the last two decades, and by some measures have even widened. Income
differences across States have fallen, but inequalities between regions within each State have risen.
European States have developed increasingly different production structures. And European
regions have also become increasingly polarised in terms of their unemployment rates.
This paper has argued that recent theories of location can help us explain these trends, and
also reconsider the role of regional policies in such an environment. Firms producing in locations
with relatively many ﬁrms face stronger competition in the local product and factor markets. This
tends to make activities dispersed in space. However, the combination of increasing returns to
scale and trade costs encourages ﬁrms to locate close to large markets, which in turn are those
with relatively many ﬁrms. This creates pecuniary externalities which favour the agglomeration
of economic activities.
Reductions in trade or transport costs, by affecting the balance between dispersion and ag-
glomeration forces can decisively affect the spatial location of economic activities. For high trade
costs, the need to supply markets locally encourages ﬁrms to locate in different regions. For in-
termediate values of trade costs, the incentives for self-sufﬁciency weaken. Pecuniary externalities
then take over, and ﬁrms and workers cluster together. However, the price of local factors and
the availability of goods tend to increase wherever agglomeration takes place. If this is the case
and there is enough mobility, as trade costs continue to fall, rising factor prices simply give an
additional kick to agglomeration by inducing immigration. On the other hand, if there is little
mobility, for very low trade costs it may be ﬁrms that relocate in response to wage differentials.
However, the combination of minimal interregional migration with institutional constraints on
interregional (but not international) wage differentials can lead to a rise in income inequalities
between regions within each country at the same time as inequalities between countries fall.
Further, if agglomeration does not get reﬂected in wage differences, it may show in unemployment
rate differences. Since clusters of activity may extend across borders, this can result in clusters of
high and low unemployment extending across regions and even across countries. Firms tend to
co-locate with ﬁrms to which they are more closely related and to avoid congestion by moving
away from ﬁrms to which they are not. This also promotes increasing specialisation in a way
which is not just be driven by traditional comparative advantage considerations.
Whether there is too much or too little agglomeration in the absence of regional policy interven-
tions is not clear. The fact that ﬁrms and workers move without taking into account the possible
losses for those left behind implies there may be to much agglomeration. On the other hand, since
when ﬁrms and workers move they do not fully take into account the beneﬁts they bring for other
ﬁrms and their impact on aggregate growth, there may be too little agglomeration. Thus, there is
no general indication of the direction in which governments should push with regional policies
when seeking efﬁciency. Even in terms of equity, the direction of policy is not obvious. Policies
that increase agglomeration may nevertheless make those that remain in poorer regions better off
by increasing production efﬁciency and the rate of growth.
28Despite these ambiguities, European regional policies have the explicit aim of reducing regional
inequalities. One of the main instruments for this is the improvement of transport infrastructure.
However, it is not obvious that lower transport costs facilitate convergence. Roads and rail
tracks can be used to travel both ways. A better connection between two regions with different
development levels not only gives ﬁrms in a less developed region better access to the inputs and
markets of more developed regions. It also makes it easier for ﬁrms in richer regions to supply
poorer regions at a distance, and can thus harm the industrialisation prospects of less developed
areas.
New economic geography models not only point out this potential ambiguity in the impact of
lower transport costs on less developed regions, they also tell us that the overall effect depends
on certain aspects of the economic environment (such as mobility and wage rigidities) and on
characteristics of the projects. On this respect, the Trans-European Transport Network will give
much of the eu better access to the main activity centres. However, the gap in relative accessibility
between core and peripheral areas is likely to increase as a result of the new infrastructure, which
reinforces the position of core regions as transport hubs. The emphasis on high-speed rail links is
also likely to favour the main nodes of the network, and is unlikely to promote the development
of new activity centres in minor nodes or in locations in between nodes.
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